Human-Interpretable Adversarial Prompt Attack on Large Language Models with Situational Context (2407.14644v2)

Abstract: Previous research on testing the vulnerabilities in LLMs using adversarial attacks has primarily focused on nonsensical prompt injections, which are easily detected upon manual or automated review (e.g., via byte entropy). However, the exploration of innocuous human-understandable malicious prompts augmented with adversarial injections remains limited. In this research, we explore converting a nonsensical suffix attack into a sensible prompt via a situation-driven contextual re-writing. This allows us to show suffix conversion without any gradients, using only LLMs to perform the attacks, and thus better understand the scope of possible risks. We combine an independent, meaningful adversarial insertion and situations derived from movies to check if this can trick an LLM. The situations are extracted from the IMDB dataset, and prompts are defined following a few-shot chain-of-thought prompting. Our approach demonstrates that a successful situation-driven attack can be executed on both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We find that across many LLMs, as few as 1 attempt produces an attack and that these attacks transfer between LLMs.