IID Prophet Inequality with Random Horizon: Going Beyond Increasing Hazard Rates

Prophet inequalities are a central object of study in optimal stopping theory. In the iid model, a gambler sees values in an online fashion, sampled independently from a given distribution. Upon observing each value, the gambler either accepts it as a reward or irrevocably rejects it and proceeds to observe the next value. The goal of the gambler, who cannot see the future, is maximising the expected value of the reward while competing against the expectation of a prophet (the offline maximum). In other words, one seeks to maximise the gambler-to-prophet ratio of the expectations. This model has been studied with infinite, finite and unknown number of values. When the gambler faces a random number of values, the model is said to have random horizon. We consider the model in which the gambler is given a priori knowledge of the horizon's distribution. Alijani et al. (2020) designed a single-threshold algorithms achieving a ratio of $1/2$ when the random horizon has an increasing hazard rate and is independent of the values. We prove that with a single-threshold, a ratio of $1/2$ is actually achievable for several larger classes of horizon distributions, with the largest being known as the $\mathcal{G}$ class in reliability theory. Moreover, we extend this result to its dual, the $\overline{\mathcal{G}}$ class (which includes the decreasing hazard rate class), and to low-variance horizons. Finally, we construct the first example of a family of horizons, for which multiple thresholds are necessary to achieve a nonzero ratio. We establish that the Secretary Problem optimal stopping rule provides one such algorithm, paving the way towards the study of the model beyond single-threshold algorithms.