Securing Multi-turn Conversational Language Models From Distributed Backdoor Triggers (2407.04151v2)

Abstract: LLMs have acquired the ability to handle longer context lengths and understand nuances in text, expanding their dialogue capabilities beyond a single utterance. A popular user-facing application of LLMs is the multi-turn chat setting. Though longer chat memory and better understanding may seemingly benefit users, our paper exposes a vulnerability that leverages the multi-turn feature and strong learning ability of LLMs to harm the end-user: the backdoor. We demonstrate that LLMs can capture the combinational backdoor representation. Only upon presentation of triggers together does the backdoor activate. We also verify empirically that this representation is invariant to the position of the trigger utterance. Subsequently, inserting a single extra token into two utterances of 5%of the data can cause over 99% Attack Success Rate (ASR). Our results with 3 triggers demonstrate that this framework is generalizable, compatible with any trigger in an adversary's toolbox in a plug-and-play manner. Defending the backdoor can be challenging in the chat setting because of the large input and output space. Our analysis indicates that the distributed backdoor exacerbates the current challenges by polynomially increasing the dimension of the attacked input space. Canonical textual defenses like ONION and BKI leverage auxiliary model forward passes over individual tokens, scaling exponentially with the input sequence length and struggling to maintain computational feasibility. To this end, we propose a decoding time defense - decayed contrastive decoding - that scales linearly with assistant response sequence length and reduces the backdoor to as low as 0.35%.