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The Good and The Bad: Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) (2402.16893v1)

Published 23 Feb 2024 in cs.CR, cs.AI, and cs.CL

Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a powerful technique to facilitate LLM with proprietary and private data, where data privacy is a pivotal concern. Whereas extensive research has demonstrated the privacy risks of LLMs, the RAG technique could potentially reshape the inherent behaviors of LLM generation, posing new privacy issues that are currently under-explored. In this work, we conduct extensive empirical studies with novel attack methods, which demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG systems on leaking the private retrieval database. Despite the new risk brought by RAG on the retrieval data, we further reveal that RAG can mitigate the leakage of the LLMs' training data. Overall, we provide new insights in this paper for privacy protection of retrieval-augmented LLMs, which benefit both LLMs and RAG systems builders. Our code is available at https://github.com/phycholosogy/RAG-privacy.

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Citations (31)
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Summary

  • The paper demonstrates that RAG systems can expose sensitive information through targeted data extraction vulnerabilities using crafted queries.
  • It employs empirical evaluations and ablation studies to assess the impact of retrieval parameters on LLM memorization and privacy leakage.
  • The study proposes mitigation techniques, including threshold settings and post-processing summarization, to reduce the risk of privacy breaches.

Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)

The paper "The Good and The Bad: Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)" explores the privacy implications inherent in the utilization of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. RAG is an advanced NLP technique that enhances text generation by incorporating information retrieved from a large corpus. This method can lead to increased breaches of sensitive data retrieved or stored in the LLM's training set. The paper scrutinizes the privacy risks posed by RAG and examines solutions to mitigate these issues.

Privacy Risks in RAG

RAG aims to improve the generation capabilities of LLMs by retrieving relevant documents from huge repositories and blending this data with the model's own outputs. A RAG system typically comprises an LLM, a retriever, and a retrieval dataset, operating in two stages: document retrieval and text generation. Figure 1

Figure 1: The RAG system and potential risks.

Two main research questions (RQ) guide this exploration:

  1. RQ1: Can private information be extracted from a RAG's external retrieval database?
  2. RQ2: Does retrieval data integration affect the memorization behavior of LLMs?

Empirical Studies and Attack Methods

RQ1: Data Extraction Vulnerability

To determine the risk of data extraction from the retrieval database, the paper posits a threat model where an attacker crafts queries to exploit retrieval systems. The respective queries consist of two components: {information} to target retrieval, and {command} to extract the output. The authors employ healthcare dialogues and corporate emails, which contain sensitive information, to empirically analyze real-world retrieval datasets. The findings reveal significant risks, with LLMs retrieving and reproducing verbatim private information at substantial rates. This confirms that RAGs are susceptible to privacy attacks if not properly managed.

To assess the effects of different parameters, such as the number of retrieved documents per query and command components, an ablation paper is conducted: Figure 2

Figure 2

Figure 2

Figure 2

Figure 2: Ablation paper on command part. (R) means Repeat Contexts and (RG) means Rouge Contexts.

Figure 3

Figure 3

Figure 3

Figure 3

Figure 3: Ablation paper on number of retrieved docs per query kk.

RQ2: Impact on LLM Memorization

The paper utilizes targeted and prefix attacks to assess whether the inclusion of retrieval data influences the LLM's inclination to reproduce memorized training data. Findings indicate that RAG can mitigate training data leakage risk by shifting reliance towards the external retrieval datasets, thus reducing vulnerability to data extraction attacks.

Risk Mitigation Strategies

Effective strategies focus on altering both retrieval and post-processing stages. Mitigation techniques include:

  • Threshold Settings: Restricting retrieval to high-similarity documents reduces unintended leakage.
  • Post-Processing Summarization: Employing extractive and paraphrasing summarization reduces the risk of private data surfacing in the LLM output. Figure 4

Figure 4

Figure 4

Figure 4

Figure 4: Potential post-processing mitigation strategies. The impact of reranking on (a) targeted attacks, (b) untargeted attacks; and the impact of summarization on (c) untargeted attacks and (d) targeted attacks.

Figure 5

Figure 5

Figure 5

Figure 5

Figure 5: The impact of retrieval threshold on performance and privacy leakage.

Conclusion

The research provides valuable insights into privacy risks and mitigations applicable to retrieval-augmented generation systems. It demonstrates that while RAG can introduce new privacy vulnerabilities, it can also act as a deterrent to training data memorization breaches when appropriately managed. Important future work involves advancing privacy-preserving techniques for these systems to maintain data integrity without compromising performance, thereby ensuring that RAG can be applied safely across various domains.