Intention Communication and Hypothesis Likelihood in Game-Theoretic Motion Planning (2209.12968v1)

Abstract: Game-theoretic motion planners are a potent solution for controlling systems of multiple highly interactive robots. Most existing game-theoretic planners unrealistically assume a priori objective function knowledge is available to all agents. To address this, we propose a fault-tolerant receding horizon game-theoretic motion planner that leverages inter-agent communication with intention hypothesis likelihood. Specifically, robots communicate their objective function incorporating their intentions. A discrete Bayesian filter is designed to infer the objectives in real-time based on the discrepancy between observed trajectories and the ones from communicated intentions. In simulation, we consider three safety-critical autonomous driving scenarios of overtaking, lane-merging and intersection crossing, to demonstrate our planner's ability to capitalize on alternative intention hypotheses to generate safe trajectories in the presence of faulty transmissions in the communication network.