Specification-Guided Learning of Nash Equilibria with High Social Welfare (2206.03348v1)

Abstract: Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for training joint policies that form a Nash equilibrium. In our approach, rather than providing low-level reward functions, the user provides high-level specifications that encode the objective of each agent. Then, guided by the structure of the specifications, our algorithm searches over policies to identify one that provably forms an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium (with high probability). Importantly, it prioritizes policies in a way that maximizes social welfare across all agents. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our algorithm computes equilibrium policies with high social welfare, whereas state-of-the-art baselines either fail to compute Nash equilibria or compute ones with comparatively lower social welfare.