Who won? Winner Determination and Robustness in Liquid Democracy (2205.05482v3)

Abstract: Liquid democracy is a decision-making paradigm in which each agent can either vote directly for some alternative or (transitively) delegate its vote to another agent. To mitigate the issue of delegation cycles or the concentration of power, delegating agents might be allowed to specify multiple delegation options. Then, a (cycle-free) delegation is selected in which each delegating agent has exactly one representative. We study the winner determination problem for this setting, i.e., whether we can select a delegation such that a given alternative wins (or does not win). Moreover, we study the robustness of winning alternatives in two ways: First, we consider whether we can make a limited number of changes to the preferences cast by the agents such that a given alternative becomes a winner in one/in all delegations, and second, whether we can make a limited number of changes to a selected delegation to make a given alternative a winner.