Compromised ACC vehicles can degrade current mixed-autonomy traffic performance while remaining stealthy against detection (2112.11986v1)

Abstract: We demonstrate that a supply-chain level compromise of the adaptive cruise control (ACC) capability on equipped vehicles can be used to significantly degrade system level performance of current day mixed-autonomy freeway networks. Via a simple threat model which causes random deceleration attacks (RDAs), compromised vehicles create congestion waves in the traffic that decrease average speed and network throughput. We use a detailed and realistic traffic simulation environment to quantify the impacts of the attack on a model of a real high-volume freeway in the United States. We find that the effect of the attack depends both on the level of underlying traffic congestion, and what percentage of ACC vehicles can be compromised. In moderate congestion regimes the attack can degrade mean commuter speed by over 7%. In high density regimes overall network throughput can be reduced by up to 3%. And, in moderate to high congestion regimes, it can cost commuters on the network over 300 USD/km hr. All of these results motivate that the proposed attack is able to significantly degrade performance of the traffic network. We also develop an anomaly detection technique that uses GPS traces on vehicles to identify malicious/compromised vehicles. We employ this technique on data from the simulation experiments and find that it is unable to identify compromised ACCs compared to benign/normal drivers. That is, these attacks are stealthy to detection. Stronger attacks can be accurately labeled as malicious, motivating that there is a limit to how impactful attacks can be before they are no longer stealthy. Finally, we experimentally execute the attack on a real and commercially available ACC vehicle, demonstrating the possible real world feasibility of an RDA.