A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism (2111.07790v1)

Abstract: We study the classic bilateral trade setting. Myerson and Satterthwaite show that there is no Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism that obtains the gains from trade of the first-best mechanism. Consider the random-offerer mechanism: with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ run the \emph{seller-offering} mechanism, in which the seller offers the buyer a take-it-or-leave-it price that maximizes the expected profit of the seller, and with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ run the \emph{buyer-offering} mechanism. Very recently, Deng, Mao, Sivan, and Wang showed that the gains from trade of the random-offerer mechanism is at least a constant factor of $\frac 1 {8.23}\approx 0.121$ of the gains from trade of the first best mechanism. Perhaps a natural conjecture is that the gains-from-trade of the random-offerer mechanism, which is known to be at least half of the gains-from-trade of the second-best mechanism, is also at least half of the gains-from-trade of the first-best mechanism. However, in this note we exhibit distributions such as the gains-from trade of the random-offerer mechanism is smaller than a $0.495$-fraction of the gains-from-trade of the first-best mechanism.