Quantum secure non-malleable-extractors

Abstract: We construct several explicit quantum secure non-malleable-extractors. All the quantum secure non-malleable-extractors we construct are based on the constructions by Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [2015] and Cohen [2015]. 1) We construct the first explicit quantum secure non-malleable-extractor for (source) min-entropy $$k \geq \textsf{poly}\left(\log \left( \frac{n}{\epsilon} \right)\right)$$ ($n$ is the length of the source and $\epsilon$ is the error parameter). Previously Aggarwal, Chung, Lin, and Vidick [2019] have shown that the inner-product based non-malleable-extractor proposed by Li [2012] is quantum secure, however it required linear (in $n$) min-entropy and seed length. Using the connection between non-malleable-extractors and privacy amplification (established first in the quantum setting by Cohen and Vidick [2017]), we get a $2$-round privacy amplification protocol that is secure against active quantum adversaries with communication $$\textsf{poly}\left(\log \left( \frac{n}{\epsilon} \right)\right)$$, exponentially improving upon the linear communication required by the protocol due to [2019]. 2) We construct an explicit quantum secure $2$-source non-malleable-extractor for min-entropy $k \geq n- n<sup>{\Omega(1)}$, with an output of size $n<sup>{\Omega(1)}$ and error $2^{- n<sup>{\Omega(1)}}$. 3) We also study their natural extensions when the tampering of the inputs is performed $t$-times. We construct explicit quantum secure $t$-non-malleable-extractors for both seeded ($t=d<sup>{\Omega(1)}$) as well as $2$-source case ($t=n<sup>{\Omega(1)}$).