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Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier

Published 3 Oct 2020 in cs.GT and cs.DS | (2010.01420v1)

Abstract: We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that achieves an O((log⁡ ⁣log⁡m)3)O((\log\!\log{m})^3)-approximation to the maximum welfare in expectation using O(n)O(n) demand queries; here mm and nn are the number of items and bidders, respectively. This breaks the longstanding logarithmic barrier for the problem dating back to the O(log⁡m⋅log⁡ ⁣log⁡m)O(\log{m}\cdot\log\!\log{m})-approximation mechanism of Dobzinski from 2007. Along the way, we also improve and considerably simplify the state-of-the-art mechanisms for submodular bidders.

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