Synthesis of Sensor Deception Attacks at the Supervisory Layer of Cyber-Physical Systems (2008.01497v1)

Abstract: We study the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the context of the supervisory control layer. Specifically, we propose a general model of a CPS attacker in the framework of discrete event systems and investigate the problem of synthesizing an attack strategy for a given feedback control system. Our model captures a class of deception attacks, where the attacker has the ability to hijack a subset of sensor readings and mislead the supervisor, with the goal of inducing the system into an undesirable state. We utilize a game-like discrete transition structure, called Insertion-Deletion Attack structure (IDA), to capture the interaction between the supervisor and the environment (which includes the system and the attacker). We show how to use IDAs to synthesize three different types of successful stealthy attacks, i.e., attacks that avoid detection from the supervisor and cause damage to the system.