Runtime Mitigation of Packet Drop Attacks in Fault-tolerant Networks-on-Chip (1908.00289v1)

Abstract: Fault-tolerant routing (FTR) in Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) has become a common practice to sustain the performance of multi-core systems with an increasing number of faults on a chip. On the other hand, usage of third-party intellectual property blocks has made security a primary concern in modern day designs. This article presents a mechanism to mitigate a denial-of-service attack, namely packet drop attack, which may arise due to the hardware Trojans (HTs) in NoCs that adopt FTR algorithms. HTs, associated with external kill switches, are conditionally triggered to enable the attack scenario. Security modules, such as authentication unit, buffer shuffler, and control unit, have been proposed to thwart the attack in runtime and restore secure packet flow in the NoC. These units work together as a shield to safeguard the packets from proceeding towards the output ports with faulty links. Synthesis results show that the proposed secure FT router, when compared with a baseline FT router, has area and power overheads of at most 4.04% and 0.90%, respectively. Performance evaluation shows that SeFaR has acceptable overheads in the execution time, energy consumption, average packet latency, and power-latency product metrics when compared with a baseline FT router while running real benchmarks, as well as synthetic traffic. Further, a possible design of a comprehensive secure router has been presented with a view to addressing and mitigating multiple attacks that can arise in the NoC routers.