Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Assistant
AI Research Assistant
Well-researched responses based on relevant abstracts and paper content.
Custom Instructions Pro
Preferences or requirements that you'd like Emergent Mind to consider when generating responses.
Gemini 2.5 Flash
Gemini 2.5 Flash 138 tok/s
Gemini 2.5 Pro 49 tok/s Pro
GPT-5 Medium 24 tok/s Pro
GPT-5 High 31 tok/s Pro
GPT-4o 92 tok/s Pro
Kimi K2 189 tok/s Pro
GPT OSS 120B 450 tok/s Pro
Claude Sonnet 4.5 34 tok/s Pro
2000 character limit reached

On Colorful Bin Packing Games (1711.03570v1)

Published 9 Nov 2017 in cs.GT

Abstract: We consider colorful bin packing games in which selfish players control a set of items which are to be packed into a minimum number of unit capacity bins. Each item has one of $m\geq 2$ colors and cannot be packed next to an item of the same color. All bins have the same unitary cost which is shared among the items it contains, so that players are interested in selecting a bin of minimum shared cost. We adopt two standard cost sharing functions: the egalitarian cost function which equally shares the cost of a bin among the items it contains, and the proportional cost function which shares the cost of a bin among the items it contains proportionally to their sizes. Although, under both cost functions, colorful bin packing games do not converge in general to a (pure) Nash equilibrium, we show that Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist and we design an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium whose running time is polynomial under the egalitarian cost function and pseudo-polynomial for a constant number of colors under the proportional one. We also provide a complete characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria under both cost functions for general games, by showing that the prices of anarchy and stability are unbounded when $m\geq 3$ while they are equal to 3 for black and white games, where $m=2$. We finally focus on games with uniform sizes (i.e., all items have the same size) for which the two cost functions coincide. We show again a tight characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria and design an algorithm which returns Nash equilibria with best achievable performance.

Citations (2)

Summary

We haven't generated a summary for this paper yet.

Lightbulb Streamline Icon: https://streamlinehq.com

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

List To Do Tasks Checklist Streamline Icon: https://streamlinehq.com

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.

Don't miss out on important new AI/ML research

See which papers are being discussed right now on X, Reddit, and more:

“Emergent Mind helps me see which AI papers have caught fire online.”

Philip

Philip

Creator, AI Explained on YouTube