Emergent Mind
Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols
(1705.02296)
Published May 5, 2017
in
cs.CR
Abstract
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: i) To design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF); ii) To formalize computational unlinkability in the model; iii) To illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the computational model.
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