Cyclic Dominance in the Spatial Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1702.04299v1)

Abstract: This paper studies scenarios of cyclic dominance in a coevolutionary spatial model in which game strategies and links between agents adaptively evolve over time. The Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (OPD) game is employed. The OPD is an extended version of the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma where players have a third option to abstain from playing the game. We adopt an agent-based simulation approach and use Monte Carlo methods to perform the OPD with coevolutionary rules. The necessary conditions to break the scenarios of cyclic dominance are also investigated. This work highlights that cyclic dominance is essential in the sustenance of biodiversity. Moreover, we also discuss the importance of a spatial coevolutionary model in maintaining cyclic dominance in adverse conditions.