dr0wned - Cyber-Physical Attack with Additive Manufacturing (1609.00133v1)

Abstract: Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is an emerging manufacturing technology that is expected to have far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental, and geopolitical implications. As use of this technology increases, it will become more common to produce functional parts, including components for safety-critical systems. AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the manufactured part's quality can be compromised by sabotage. This paper demonstrates the validity of this concern, as we present the very first full chain of attack involving AM, beginning with a cyber attack aimed at compromising a benign AM component, continuing with malicious modification of a manufactured object's blueprint, leading to the sabotage of the manufactured functional part, and resulting in the physical destruction of a cyber-physical system that employs this part. The contributions of this paper are as follows. We propose a systematic approach to identify opportunities for an attack involving AM that enables an adversary to achieve his/her goals. Then we propose a methodology to assess the level of difficulty of an attack, thus enabling differentiation between possible attack chains. Finally, to demonstrate the experimental proof for the entire attack chain, we sabotage the 3D printed propeller of a quadcopter UAV, causing the quadcopter to literally fall from the sky.

• The paper introduces a systematic framework to identify AM attack vectors and vulnerabilities across software and hardware.
• The paper demonstrates an experimental cyber attack on a desktop 3D printer that altered a UAV propeller design, leading to operational failure.
• The paper analyzes multiple exploitation techniques in AM processes and calls for enhanced cybersecurity measures to safeguard critical systems.

Cyber-Physical Attacks on Additive Manufacturing

The paper "Cyber-Physical Attack with Additive Manufacturing" presents an extensive investigation into the potential for cyber-physical attacks in the field of additive manufacturing (AM), commonly known as 3D printing. The research highlights the unique vulnerabilities associated with the computerized nature of AM and its implications for both public safety and national security, especially as AM becomes more prevalent in producing safety-critical components.

The authors successfully demonstrate the entire lifecycle of an attack on an AM system, from the initial cyber intrusion to the eventual physical sabotage of the manufactured part, culminating in the failure of the incorporating system. This work stands out by not only addressing the theoretical feasibility of such attacks but also providing a systematic methodology and empirical evidence supporting the possibility.

Key Contributions

1. Systematic Approach: The paper establishes a framework for identifying potential attack vectors in AM workflows. It introduces a methodology to evaluate the complexity and probability of different attack chains, thus offering a comprehensive perspective on AM vulnerabilities.
2. Demonstrative Cyber-Physical Attack: This paper provides experimental validation through an attack on a desktop 3D printer. The researchers remotely compromised a 3D printer to alter a specific propeller design used in a quadcopter UAV. The resultant sabotage led to the UAV's physical destruction during operation, vividly illustrating the implications of a cyber attack on AM-generated parts.
3. Threat Analysis and Exploitation: Through a detailed categorization of possible manipulations and attack vectors, the research offers insights into software and hardware vulnerabilities. This includes potential code injections, firmware manipulations, and network-based attacks, thereby highlighting potential entry points for attackers.

Implications and Future Directions

The implications of this research are profound, particularly as AM continues to be integrated into the production lines of industries responsible for critical infrastructure. The demonstration that a small desktop 3D printer can be manipulated to catastrophic effect suggests that larger, more industrial-grade systems may be equally vulnerable.

Practically, the paper calls for heightened vigilance and enhanced security protocols within AM processes. In the future, it would be prudent for manufacturers and regulatory bodies to implement comprehensive cybersecurity measures tailored specifically to the intricacies of AM systems. Theoretically, this research invites further exploration into resilient AM design to counteract potential sabotage, as well as the development of guidelines for secure AM deployment and operation.

Additionally, considering the broader adoption of AM across diverse sectors, future work could explore scalable security solutions that can be adapted to varied AM environments, from small-scale home users to large industrial applications. Another avenue for exploration might be the development of real-time monitoring systems capable of detecting and mitigating sabotage in flight or during the production of parts.

In conclusion, the paper sets a precedent for considering cybersecurity as an integral element of AM operations. While its primary focus is on identifying vulnerabilities and demonstrating the feasibility of attacks, it lays the groundwork for developing robust defenses that can safeguard the promising advances brought about by additive manufacturing.