Emergent Mind
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
(1608.06580)
Published Aug 23, 2016
in
cs.GT
and
cs.CC
Abstract
For a constant $\epsilon$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of $(\epsilon,\epsilon)$-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least $(1-\epsilon)$-fraction of the players are $\epsilon$-best replying.
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