Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations (1503.02200v3)

Abstract: We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each buyer. We apply sequential posted price mechanisms to single-parameter multi-unit settings in which each buyer demands only one item and the mechanism can assign the service to at most k of the buyers. For standard sequential posted price mechanisms, we prove that with the valuation distribution having finite support, no sequential posted price mechanism can extract a constant fraction of the optimal expected revenue, even with unlimited supply. We extend this result to the the case of a continuous valuation distribution when various standard assumptions hold simultaneously. In fact, it turns out that the best fraction of the optimal revenue that is extractable by a sequential posted price mechanism is proportional to ratio of the highest and lowest possible valuation. We prove that for two simple generalizations of these mechanisms, a better revenue performance can be achieved: if the sequential posted price mechanism has for each buyer the option of either proposing an offer or asking the buyer for its valuation, then a Omega(1/max{1,d}) fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted, where d denotes the degree of dependence of the valuations, ranging from complete independence (d=0) to arbitrary dependence (d=n-1). Moreover, when we generalize the sequential posted price mechanisms further, such that the mechanism has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the i-th buyer that depends on the valuations of all buyers except i's, we prove that a constant fraction (2-sqrt{e})/4~0.088 of the optimal revenue can be always be extracted.