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Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games (1401.3325v3)

Published 14 Jan 2014 in cs.LO, cs.GT, and math.GN

Abstract: We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental approaches: one requires strong topological restrictions on the games, but produces very strong existence results. The other merely requires some very basic determinacy properties to still obtain some existence results. Both results are transfer results: starting with the existence of some equilibria for a small class of games, they allow us to conclude the existence of some type of equilibria for a larger class. To make the abstract results more concrete, we investigate as a special case infinite sequential games with real-valued payoff functions. Depending on the class of payoff functions (continuous, upper semi-continuous, Borel) and whether the game is zero-sum, we obtain various existence results for equilibria. Our results hold for games with two or up to countably many players.

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