On Oblivious PTAS's for Nash Equilibrium (1102.2280v1)

Abstract: If a game has a Nash equilibrium with probability values that are either zero or Omega(1) then this equilibrium can be found exhaustively in polynomial time. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there is a PTAS for the games whose equilibria are guaranteed to have small-O(1/n)-values, and therefore large-Omega(n)-supports. We also point out that there is a PTAS for games with sparse payoff matrices, which are known to be PPAD-complete to solve exactly. Both algorithms are of a special kind that we call oblivious: The algorithm just samples a fixed distribution on pairs of mixed strategies, and the game is only used to determine whether the sampled strategies comprise an eps-Nash equilibrium; the answer is yes with inverse polynomial probability. These results bring about the question: Is there an oblivious PTAS for Nash equilibrium in general games? We answer this question in the negative; our lower bound comes close to the quasi-polynomial upper bound of [Lipton, Markakis, Mehta 2003]. Another recent PTAS for anonymous games is also oblivious in a weaker sense appropriate for this class of games (it samples from a fixed distribution on unordered collections of mixed strategies), but its runtime is exponential in 1/eps. We prove that any oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies and three player types must have 1/eps^c in the exponent of the running time for some c>1/3, rendering the algorithm in [Daskalakis 2008] essentially optimal within oblivious algorithms. In contrast, we devise a poly(n) (1/eps)^O(log^2(1/eps)) non-oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with 2 strategies and any bounded number of player types. Our algorithm is based on the construction of a sparse (and efficiently computable) eps-cover of the set of all possible sums of n independent indicators, under the total variation distance. The size of the cover is poly(n) (1/ eps^{O(log^2 (1/eps))}.